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RECENT DECISIONS
PROCEDuRE-Indictments-Due Process-Former AcquittalA defendant, once acquitted of murder, may be retried under a manslaughter indictment and convicted of manslaughter, although the
evidence presented proved the crime of murder but not that of manslaughter.
CRIMINAL

Commonwealth v. Frazier, 420 Pa. 209, 216 A.2d 337 (1966).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, speaking through Chief Justice
Bell, has decided that a defendant acquitted on a charge of murder may
be retried, and convicted of voluntary manslaughter where the evidence
in the second trial is sufficient to sustain a murder conviction, but not
that of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant was indicted under two
separate bills of indictment in 1961; one for murder, and the other for
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. The following year he was
tried for murder. The jury found the defendant guilty of voluntary
manslaughter. Subsequently the defendant appealed to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, which reversed the verdict of the trial court because of
prejudicial error in the instructions to the jury and a new trial was
ordered.'
Defendant was again brought to trial on June 21, 1965; this time he
was tried for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter under the second
indictment. When the prosecution concluded its case the defendant demurred on the ground that the State had failed to establish the necessary
elements of voluntary manslaughter; namely, passion or legally adequate
provocation.' The defendant's demurrer was sustained by the trial court,
whereupon the Commonwealth appealed.'
In Pennsylvania, a jury verdict in the first trial, finding the defendant
guilty of voluntary manslaughter, has the legal effect of acquitting him
on the charge of murder.4 In such a case as this, however, although the
evidence is legally insufficient to establish the elements of manslaughter,
the jury may return a manslaughter verdict regardless of this fact. The
only requirement is that the evidence be such as would support a murder
conviction. 5 The defendant, as a result, may not be retried for murder in
that this would violate his right to be protected from being twice put in
1. Commonwealth v. Frazier, 411 Pa. 195, 191 A.2d 369 (1963).
2. Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961); Commonwealth v.
Nelson, 396 Pa. 359, 152 A.2d 913 (1959).
3. Commonwealth v. Frazier, 420 Pa. 209, 216 A.2d 337 (1966).
4. Commonwealth v. Flax, 331 Pa. 145, 200 At]. 632 (1938); Commonwealth v. Deitrick, 221 Pa. 7, 70 At. 275 (1908); Commonwealth v. Gabor, 209 Pa. 201, 58 AtI. 278
(1904).
5. Commonwealth v. Frazier, supra note 1.
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jeopardy for the same offense.' He can and was retried for voluntary
manslaughter in the Frazier case after the supreme court reversed the
trial court's previous manslaughter verdict.7
The court, in overruling the defendant's demurrer, justified the position
taken on the basis of public policy. According to Chief Justice Bell, the
primary purpose of our penal laws is to protect society. In order to
accomplish this purpose all criminals must be incarcerated.' The court
failed, however, to go any further than expounding its own jurisprudential
attitude toward the criminal law and its purpose. No authority whatever
was cited to sustain the position taken. The apparent legal implications
which the case presented were ignored. In short, the opinion as written is
void of any true legal analysis.
The court has now extended the Pennsylvania rule of allowing a verdict
of manslaughter to be returned on a murder indictment to include the
present fact situation where the indictment is for manslaughter, and the
evidence would support a murder conviction. Two constitutional issues,
undiscussed by the majority, but which certainly must merit some consideration from the court are those of "due process"1 ° and "double
jeopardy," as it effects one's right to due process."
The dissenting opinions of Justices Jones 2 and Cohen 13 recognize that
the due process argument should have been considered by the majority
of the court. Both dissenting justices were dissatisfied with the decision
since it enunciates a principle of law contrary to the concept of "fundamental fairness" afforded those accused of crime in our society. The
defendant had been indicted for voluntary manslaughter, not murder.
Notwithstanding this fact, the evidence produced by the Commonwealth
alleged the crime of murder, a crime of which the defendant had been
previously acquitted. In overruling the defendant's demurrer, the court
has permitted a defendant to be tried and convicted for a crime which he
did not commit, at least according to the allegations and the evidence. As
Justice Cohen stated:
No appeal to emotions

. . .

should deprive any accused of the

right to know the nature of the crime with which he is charged
and to require the evidence upon which he is convicted to con-

6. Commonwealth ex rel. Walker v. Banmiller, 186 Pa. Super. 338, 142 A.2d 758 (1958).
7. Commonwealth v. Frazier, supra note 1.
8. Commonwealth v. Frazier, supra note 3.
9. Commonwealth v. Comber, 374 Pa. 570, 97 A.2d 343 (1953).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
11. Ibid.
12. Commonwealth v. Frazier, supra note 3, at 214, 216 A.2d at 339.
13. Id. at 217, 216 A.2d at 340.
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form with the charged crime.
To do so deprives him of his
4
liberty without due process.1

The law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania protects its citizens
from the perils of retrial after an acquittal."5 In the Frazier18 case, after
the defendant had been acquitted of murder, the court permitted the
murder indictment 7 to be transmitted into a charge of manslaughter, the
effect of which was that although the jury could not return a verdict of
murder, they could treat the manslaughter indictment as though it were
one for murder in order to return the lesser verdict of manslaughter. The
court has extended the merger doctrine which permits a manslaughter
verdict where the indictment is for murder to the Frazier1 8 situation.
There, although the indictment was for manslaughter, the effect was to
retry the defendant for murder, with the not insignificant exception that
the jury was deprived of returning a murder conviction. In all other
respects, however, the court has treated the manslaughter indictment as
though it were synonomous with one for murder. The question such a
course of action raises, however, is whether this is a violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights' 9 by subjecting him to retrial for a
crime of which he was formerly acquitted.2"
The majority of the court failed to consider this aspect of the case
and as a result these issues are left unresolved. Insofar as the court failed
to consider them, one must infer that the court has found them devoid
of any merit.
F. Regan Nerone
14. Ibid., 216 A.2d at 341.

15. Commonwealth ex rel. Walker v. Banmiller, supra note 6. See also, United States v.
Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965), wherein the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-

cuit has found that the double jeopardy provision of the United States Constitution is
applicable to the states through the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Pennsylvania courts, governed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on fderal ques-

tions, is not restricted by this decision.
16. Commonwealth v. Frazier, supra note 3.
17. Commonwealth v. Frazier, supra note 1.
18. Commonwealth v. Frazier, supra note 3.
19. United States v. Wilkins, supra note 15.
20. Commonwealth ex rel. Walker v. Banmiller, supra note 6.

